rusjelRussian Journal of Economics and LawRussian Journal of Economics and Law2782-2923"TCE "Taglimat"" Ltd.10.21202/2782-2923.2025.1.21-36rusjel-2618Research ArticleКРИПТОМИР И ЦИФРОВЫЕ ФИНАНСЫCRYPTO-WORLD AND DIGITAL FINANCEТаргетирование инфляции в условиях фискального стимулированияInflation targeting in the context of fiscal stimulationhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2620-8515АндрюшинС. А.AndryushinS. A.

Андрюшин Сергей Анатольевич, доктор экономических наук, профессор, главный научный сотрудник

Web of Science Researcher ID: N-7005-2017

г. Москва

Sergey A. Andryushin, Dr. Sci. (Econ.), Professor, Chief Researcher

Web of Science Researcher: N-7005-2017

Moscow

 

sandr956@gmail.comИнститут экономики Российской академии наукРоссияInstitute of Economics of the Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation2025140320251912136Copyright © Андрюшин С.А., 20252025Андрюшин С.А.Andryushin S.A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.rusjel.ru/jour/article/view/2618Цель

Цель: анализ текущих проблем, ограничивающих эффективность функционирования традиционного режима таргетирования инфляции; корректировка базовых характеристик данного монетарного режима обеспечения ценовой стабильности с целью повышения достоверности макроэкономического прогноза центральных банков.

Методы

Методы: в статье использованы эмпирический, статистический, логический и  сравнительный методы экономического анализа, позволяющие изучать особенности развития режима таргетирования инфляции центральных банков в условиях стимулирующей фискальной политики.

Результаты

Результаты: рассмотрены базовые характеристики традиционного режима таргетирования инфляции; выявлены недостатки режима таргетирования инфляции; сделан обзор научной литературы по особенностям функционирования режима таргетирования инфляции в рамках как монетарного, так и фискального доминирования; определены основные постулаты фискальной теории регулирования уровня цен; предложен для Банка России ряд рекомендательных мер, связанных с корректировкой действующего режима таргетирования инфляции.

Научная новизна

Научная новизна: показано, что повышение ключевой ставки без изменений фискальных компонентов в денежно-кредитной политике не способствует снижению инфляции даже в краткосрочной перспективе; рациональные ожидания и денежно-кредитная политика, анализируемые в рамках фискальной теории, не позволяют снизить инфляцию без фискальной поддержки; в странах с режимом таргетирования инфляции высокие процентные ставки способны повысить риски обслуживания государственного долга и привести к росту бюджетных дефицитов; фискальная политика правительства способна создать фискальную инфляцию, которую не в состоянии контролировать и регулировать центральный банк; в условиях стремительного роста государственного долга и бюджетных дефицитов в ведущих странах, скорее всего, следует ожидать, что в перспективе фискальная инфляция станет главным компонентом устойчивого роста мировой инфляции; если суверенный долг деноминирован в местной валюте, то страна-заемщик будет подвержена валютному риску, который переносится международными инвесторами или торговыми партнерами России на долговые обязательства в российской валюте.

Практическая значимость

Практическая значимость: основные положения и выводы могут быть использованы: для регулирования процентной политики (реальных процентных ставок), создания и накопления «буферов» первичного профицита, связанных с расходами по привлечению и обслуживанию государственного долга; для разработки механизма по перераспределению реальных выплат, дифференцированных по срокам погашения государственного долга; в условиях роста фискальных дисбалансов государственный долг можно снизить за счет роста инфляции и использования первичных профицитов; в течение 2022–2024 гг. денежно-кредитная политика Банка России функционирует в рамках режима фискального доминирования, о чем свидетельствуют базовые фискальные компоненты, отсутствующие в макроэкономическом прогнозе; в бюджетный блок Квартальной прогнозной модели Банка России необходимо включить такие фискальные компоненты, как размер профицита бюджета, привязанный к доходности облигаций государственного сектора, размер государственного долга и объем бюджетных ассигнований, направляемых на погашение долга, что позволит пересмотреть прогноз ожидаемой инфляции с учетом фискальной инфляции.

Objective

Objective: to analyze the current issues limiting the effectiveness of the traditional inflation targeting regime; to adjust the basic characteristics of this monetary regime which ensures price stability in order to increase the reliability of the central banks’ macroeconomic forecast.

Methods

Methods: the article uses empirical, statistical, logical, and comparative methods of economic analysis to study the specifics of the central banks’ inflation targeting regime in the context of stimulating fiscal policy.

Results

Results: the article considers the basic characteristics of the traditional inflation targeting regime; identifies the disadvantages of the inflation targeting regime; and reviews the scientific literature on the inflation targeting regime functioning within the monetary and fiscal dominance. The main postulates of the fiscal theory of price regulation are identified. A number of recommendatory measures to adjust the current inflation targeting regime are proposed for the Bank of Russia.

Scientific novelty

Scientific novelty: the author showed that raising the key rate without changing the fiscal components in monetary policy cannot reduce inflation even in the short term. Rational expectations and monetary policy, analyzed in the framework of fiscal theory, do not reduce inflation without fiscal support. In countries with inflation targeting, high interest rates can increase risks of servicing public debt and lead to increased budget deficits. The government’s fiscal policy may create fiscal inflation that the central bank will be unable to control and regulate. Given the rapid growth of public debt and budget deficits in the leading countries, it is likely that fiscal inflation will become the main component of a sustained increase in global inflation in the future. If the sovereign debt is denominated in local currency, the borrowing country will be exposed to currency risk, which is transferred by international investors or Russia’s trading partners to debt obligations in Russian currency.

Practical significance

Practical significance: the main provisions and conclusions can be used: to regulate interest rate policy (real interest rates), create and accumulate “buffers” of primary surplus related to the costs of attracting and servicing public debt; to develop a mechanism for redistributing real payments differentiated by the maturity of public debt; under the growing fiscal imbalances, government debt can be reduced by increasing inflation and using primary surpluses; during 2022–2024, the monetary policy of the Bank of Russia operates within a fiscal dominance regime, as evidenced by the basic fiscal components missing from the macroeconomic forecast; the fiscal components (such as the size of the budget surplus linked to the yield of public sector bonds, the size of government debt and the amount of budget allocations allocated to the Bank of Russia’s Quarterly Forecast Model) should be included in the budget block of the Bank of Russia to repay the debt, which will make it possible to revise the expected inflation forecast, taking into account fiscal inflation.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.