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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">rusjel</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Russian Journal of Economics and Law</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Russian Journal of Economics and Law</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2782-2923</issn><publisher><publisher-name>"TCE "Taglimat"" Ltd.</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21202/1993-047X.15.2021.1.135-173</article-id><article-id custom-type="edn" pub-id-type="custom">NRMMKU</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">rusjel-64</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ПЕРЕВОДНЫЕ СТАТЬИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>TRANSLATED ARTICLES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>(Не)корпоративное криптоуправление</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>(Un)Corporate Crypto-Governance</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Рейес</surname><given-names>К. Л.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Reyes</surname><given-names>C. L.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">noemail@neicon.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">Школа права Университета штата Мичиган<country>Соединённые Штаты Америки</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en">Michigan State University College of Law<country>United States</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2021</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>30</day><month>03</month><year>2021</year></pub-date><volume>15</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>135</fpage><lpage>173</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Рейес К.Л., 2021</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2021</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Рейес К.Л.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Reyes C.L.</copyright-holder><license license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.rusjel.ru/jour/article/view/64">https://www.rusjel.ru/jour/article/view/64</self-uri><abstract><p>Цель: создание структуры корпоративного управления и механизма правового регулирования блокчейн-протоколов. Методы: диалектический подход к познанию социальных явлений, позволяющий проанализировать их в историческом развитии и функционировании в контексте совокупности объективных и субъективных факторов, который определил выбор следующих методов исследования: формально-логический, сравнительно-правовой и социологический. Результаты: технология блокчейна возникла из идеи шифропанков о возможности регулирования без вмешательства в частную жизнь. Основываясь на этой идее, многие члены экосистемы блокчейн-технологии призывают рассматривать код как единственный закон, применимый к блокчейн-протоколам, проводимым с его помощью транзакциям и объектам доступа к данным. В настоящее время код некоторых протоколов, таких как Bitcoin и Ethereum, воплощает первоначальную культуру шифропанков, а именно отдает приоритет неприкосновенности частной жизни и сохраняющим ее механизмам управления. Однако этот код может измениться. Фактически принятые и насаждаемые правительствами законы могут служить стимулами для таких изменений. На самом деле такие стимулы уже действуют во благо или во вред, когда программисты прекращают свою работу из страха преследования по закону. Принятие контрактной системы управления, в которой четко определены правила и ожидания, даст возможность сообществам блокчейн-протоколов максимально сохранить свою культуру и принципы. Это также заставит указанные сообщества вступить в открытый, активный и вдумчивый диалог относительно своей коллективной культуры и принципов. Кроме того, формирование структур управления блокчейном на основе контрактов, которые сходны со структурами корпоративного управления, позволит блокчейн-сообществам воспользоваться богатейшим опытом исследований и экспериментов в функционально эквивалентной области управления.Научная новизна: в работе обосновано, что самое сильное влияние (не)корпоративное криптоуправление может оказать на культуру традиционных корпораций. Важное положение модели корпоративного управления для механизма управления «вне блокчейна» состоит в признании того, что «код как закон» - это подсистема правовых норм внутри правовой системы. Системный анализ показывает, что необходимо признать обоюдное влияние взаимосвязанных функций кода и права в процессе ограничения поведения в экосистемах блокчейна. Иными словами, код определяет правовые нормы и их приложение к экосистеме блокчейна, а право, в свою очередь, определяет действия, предпринимаемые через код. В результате такое взаимопересечение кода и права оказывает влияние и на наше понимание возможностей применения права к более традиционным сценариям.Практическая значимость: основные положения и выводы статьи могут быть использованы в научной, педагогической и правоприменительной деятельности при рассмотрении вопросов, связанных с (не)корпоративным криптоуправлением.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Objective: creating the corporate governance structure and legal regulation mechanism of blockchain protocols.Methods: dialectical approach to cognition of social phenomena, allowing to analyze them in historical development and functioning in the context of the totality of objective and subjective factors, which predetermined the following research methods: formal-logical, comparative-legal, and sociological.Results: Blockchain technology was born out of a Cypherpunk vision for regulation without sacrificing privacy. This vision feeds a call by some in the blockchain technology ecosystem to view computer code as the only law applicable to blockchain protocols, transactions conducted on the protocols, and DAOs. The code of certain protocols, such as the Bitcoin blockchain and Ethereum, currently embody their Cypherpunk cultural origins, placing a premium on privacy and governance mechanisms that preserve privacy. But that code can change. In fact, laws enacted and enforced by governments may act as the stimuli for such change. Indeed, such stimuli, for better or worse, are already in play, with coders ceasing work for fear of legal repercussions. Adopting a contract-based governance system in which the rules and expectations are clearly defined empowers blockchain protocol communities to preserve as much of their cultures and visions as possible. Adopting these contracts also requires blockchain communities to engage in open, active, and thoughtful conversation about their collective culture and vision. Further, basing blockchain governance structures in contracts that loosely resemble corporate governance structures allows such communities to tap into centuries of scholarship and experimentation in a functionally equivalent governance arena. Scientific novelty: the work proves that the biggest cultural impact of (un)corporate crypto-governance may be on the culture of traditional corporations. Indeed, one significant lesson of a corporate governance model for off-chain governance may be a sharpened recognition that “code as law” is a subsystem of regulatory norms within the greater legal system. Viewed through systems analysis, the result is a two-way recognition of the interconnected roles of code and law in limiting behavior within the blockchain ecosystem. In other words, the code informs the law and its application to a blockchain ecosystem. Meanwhile, law informs behavior and activities undertaken through the code. The result is that the intersection of code and law can impact our understanding of how to apply the law in more traditional scenarios as well.Practical significance: the main provisions and conclusions of the article can be used in scientific, pedagogical and law enforcement activities when considering issues related to (un)corporate crypto-governance.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>блокчейн-технологии</kwd><kwd>блокчейн-протоколы</kwd><kwd>криптовалюта</kwd><kwd>криптоуправление</kwd><kwd>экосистема</kwd><kwd>код</kwd><kwd>биткоин</kwd><kwd>эфириум</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>Blockchain technology</kwd><kwd>Blockchain protocols</kwd><kwd>Cryptocurrency</kwd><kwd>Crypto-governance</kwd><kwd>Ecosystem</kwd><kwd>Code</kwd><kwd>Bitcoin</kwd><kwd>Ethereum</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Vaidhyanathan S. 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