From coordination to implementation: transformation of the industrial policy of the Union State of Russia and Belarus

Introduction

The year 2024 will mark the 25^th anniversary of the strategic partnership between Russia and Belarus within the Union State. This is an occasion to summarize the results of economic and industrial integration of the two states. For Russia, a great role nowadays is played by the strategy of building deep partnerships with friendly countries in the context of common technological development (Polterovich, 2023). The Republic of Belarus is a key ally in this respect. This is especially important in the industrial sector, as joint efforts of the Union State in the field of industrial and scientific-technological development contribute to strengthening technological sovereignty and can lead to synergistic effects in the national economies of the two countries.

The study objective is to analyze the evolution of the common industrial policy of the Union State of Russia and Belarus from 1999 to 2024. The research tasks include: a) to analyze the main strategic documents devoted to industrial development in the Union State over the past twenty-five years; b) to study the main trends in macroeconomic indicators of scientific-technological development; c) to study the regional aspects of integration by analyzing the statistics of joint Russian-Belarusian enterprises; d) to define the current trends in the industrial policy of the Union State of Russia and Belarus.

When choosing research methods, we rely on the complementary analysis of macroeconomic and regional aspects of industrial policy in the field of technological sovereignty of the Union State. At the first stage of the research, we analyzed domestic and foreign scientific literature devoted to the development of industrial policy of states and the choice of tools for its implementation in different countries.

At the second stage we analyzed the main documents reflecting the aspiration of the Union State countries to economic integration and the main tools of industrial policy of Russia and Belarus in the context of achieving technological sovereignty. We compared the tools of industrial policy specified in the Agreement on a Common Structural Industrial Policy of 1999 and the Agreement on a Common Industrial Policy of 2023. Then we analyzed the tools aimed at creating and implementing the integration policy between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus in the industrial sphere, which are reflected in the Main Directions for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State for 2021–2023 and for 2024–2026.

Since the implementation of Union programs should contribute to the growth of interaction between enterprises of the Union (this is the hypothesis of our study), understanding the dynamics of the presence of joint ventures in the Russian market becomes an important factor in deepening economic integration between Russia and Belarus. In this regard, at the third stage we investigated regional aspects of economic development in the Union State by analyzing the statistics of joint Russian-Belarusian enterprises registered in Belarus and in the regions of Russia, as well as their sectoral affiliation. We also investigated the regional trends of economic interaction between the Union State countries.

The study object is economic integration between the countries of the Union State. The subject matter of the study is, firstly, the industrial policy of the Union State countries, reflected in strategic documents, and secondly, the dynamics of joint ventures with Russian capital in Belarus and joint ventures with Belarusian capital in the Russian regions. The sample of statistical indicators is based on the data of the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation and its territorial branches, as well as on the open data of the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus.

Research results

Available research on the topic

Industrial policy and the choice of tools for its implementation is a relevant trend of modern global economic development (Fenna, 2016; Weiss, 2017). At the same time, as was shown by Rodrik (2004. P. 3), an effective industrial policy needs to build interaction between the public and the private sectors to solve problems and achieve industrial development goals in the most promising areas.

The evolution of industrial policy understanding and application was considered by Chang (2020), who showed the need to form new approaches to industrial policy in relation to three key directions of production systems transformation: globalization of value chains, financialization of the global economy, and the large-scale role of technological giants. Juhasz et al. (2022) analyzes the practice of different industrial policy measures and its segmentation into large-scale R&D support, sectoral and territorial industrial policy. A new industrial policy, more relevant at the current stage of geopolitical changes, is also proposed, as well as the limitations of integration processes of globalization, based on more flexible tools, such as providing a range of business services, educational and infrastructural support, start-up capital and targeted loans.

The analytical study by Cherif et al. (2022) investigates industrial policy tools in five key areas: commodity market, financial market, labor and real estate market policies, and new technologies. Dolfsma and Mamica (2020) suggest using a flexible adaptive industrial policy based on an institutional approach; according to them, an effective industrial policy should be tailored to the regional specificity and circumstances of its presence. Criscuolo and colleagues propose a taxonomy of industrial policy tools depending on the approach, focusing on the demand or supply, as well as on the overall industrial development framework, which includes ensuring well-functioning financial markets, labor mobility, tax system, business support, intellectual property protection, and technical standardization (Criscuolo et al., 2022. P. 19). Diegues et al. (2023) present a typology of industrial policies based on the conditions of their implementation.

Aiginger (2007) argues that industrial policy is becoming, on the one hand, increasingly sector- and technology-specific and, on the other hand, increasingly comprehensive and systemic, integrating education, innovation, regional policy, competition policy, labor relations and environmental protection, while developing synergy between them. One of the key aspects of modern industrial policy is its integration with other economy sectors and the use of a multi-level approach. Juhasz and Steinwender (2024) note that states have applied a huge variety of different policies aimed primarily, but not exclusively, at promoting industrialization and export development. The paper provides examples of how countries have used industrial policies aimed at stimulating production, technology, and infrastructure provision, and how these efforts may have played a role in the successes or failures of industrialization.

Naudé (2010) showed that industrial policy offers new opportunities for developing countries to accelerate industrialization. The main challenges to industrial policy in such countries are economic globalization and the redistribution of world trade, agro-food industrialization and crises in fuel, financial and product markets, climate change, the continued growth of India and China, and the rise of entrepreneurial economy. Current research addresses the thesis that sound industrial policy can significantly improve a country’s economic performance (Pereira & dos Santos, 2023; Nem Singh, 2023; Lane, 2020).

Lashkaripour and Lugovskyy (2022) study the impact of three industrial policy tools on national income. They show that for most economies the unimplemented benefits of deep cooperation dominate both the short-run and long-run benefits of unilateral policy tools. A conclusion is made that coordinated international cooperation is more beneficial to a state than unilateral trade policies.

A significant number of studies is devoted to the industrial policy of individual countries and industries. For example, Sunley et al. (2022) study the relationship between industrial and regional policy to achieve economic growth in the UK. Bonvillian (2022) points to the US transition to the industrial innovation policy due to technological competition with China and the need to achieve leadership in advanced technologies. The work by Conley and van Acker (2011) demonstrate the need for industrial policy to improve the structure to overcome resource dependence and climate change. Current publications investigate the industrial policy of supranational groups such as the European Union (hereafter EU) (Molica, 2024; Pichler et al., 2021), EAEU (Kamalyan et al., 2022), its change over time (Carlsson, 2016; Bulfone, 2022). McNamara (2023) investigates the approaches of a common EU industrial policy based on market interventions and a new geopolitical strategy in the current conditions. As emphasized by Pichler et al. (2021), the EU’s new industrial strategy aims for it to “become more competitive as [industry] becomes greener and more circular”¹ , and to “create leading markets for clean technologies and provide leadership for European industry at the global level”² .

The role of industrial policy in creating China’s unprecedented economic growth has been the subject of a considerable number of publications (Chu, 2017; Liu, 2022; Herrera et al., 2022). They showed that China’s shipbuilding policy (Barwick et al., 2019) had helped to propel China’s shipbuilding industry to global leadership through strong investment support. In a study by DiPippo et al. (2022) on Chinese industrial policy, public financing of priority areas and government support are recognized as the most effective tools. Among the priority institutional mechanisms of government support for technological development are technology transfer support, public-private research consortia and public research institutes, while direct subsidies, R&D grants and financial coordination are listed among the most important market mechanisms for technology development.

Researchers also note the high effectiveness of China’s industrial policy, built on five-year planning and targeted support for priority industries (Cen et al., 2023), which impacts competing companies from the United States, Japan, and other industrialized countries and has brought the country to the world leading positions. In addition, the article examines the strategies and tools used by U.S. firms to protect their interests and competitiveness in the face of increasing global technological competition. The study shows that U.S. firms are actively using tools such as lobbying, legal measures, and strategic alliances to counter China’s industrial policies. The focus is on how these strategies help maintain technological leadership and protect the inner market from external threats.

Lane’s (2022) empirical retrospective study of the South Korean economic miracle analyzes the role of industrial policy in the establishment of heavy and chemical industries. In addition to increasing industrial production in the selected industries, this caused improvements in a range of macroeconomic indicators, from labor productivity to the country’s export. Investment promotion and trade policy are recognized as key instruments of industrial policy. In this case, targeted lending through subsidized, predominantly public, strategic loans with low interest rates and long repayment periods was the main lever of industrial policy.

Researchers also investigate industrial policies for the development of specific industries: a successful impact of industrial policy when establishing a bioethanol industry in Brazil (Mingo & Khanna, 2014), new renewable energy industries and a typology of industries from the perspective of their response to the industrial policies implemented by the state (Kelsey, 2018). Harrison et al. (2017) studied the green industrial policy and cautioned against exaggerating the impact of industrial policy in the context of emissions regulation and renewable energy. Qiao et al. (2022) establish a link between industrial policy measures and industrial production in the targeted industries, as well as indirect effects on related industries, by the example of hydrogen transportation. The positive impact of government industrial policy on output growth and industry structure change is shown, using the example of the Indian automobile industry (Sharmelly & Ray, 2018) and the pharmaceutical industry (Chandran & Brahmachari, 2018). At the same time, the limitations of the industrial policy impact in oligopolistic market are pointed out (Mcgovern, 2011).

Regional industrial policy in its relationship with the state-wide industrial policy is a special field of study. The authors emphasize the need for industrial policy to equalize economic growth in the regions (Bailey, 2023), criticize the cluster approach and propose the horizontal spatial approach based on intellectual specialization (Nathan & Overman, 2013), the latter approach being also approved to support lagging regions (Barzotto et al., 2020). Hervas-Oliver et al. (2022) point out the need to build integration between governmental structures and regional actors to develop an effective strategic industrial policy.

Juhász et al. (2024) in their analytical summarizing paper show that industrial policy is becoming increasingly relevant in the international arena and its practices are export-oriented and technocratic, with more than 60 % of industrial policy documents being company-specific and sector-specific. They also note that industrial policy is applied unevenly, concentrating in countries with high per capita incomes, such as Germany, Japan, Brazil, and Canada.

Having analyzed publications on industrial policy, we may summarize the main tools and approaches that can be used for its implementation (Table 1). What is common in these approaches is that the tools of industrial policy impact are aimed at financial and investment support for the development of specific industries and competitiveness in foreign markets.

Turning to industrial policy at the present stage is explained, first of all, by the development of technologies of the fourth industrial revolution, which in many respects become an instrument of geopolitical superiority (Crespi et al., 2021. P. 352), overcome national barriers and entail a complete change in the economic paradigm (Farrand & Carrapico, 2022), threatening to destroy the political sovereignty of states (Pohle & Thiel, 2020). The special role of industrial policy in the period of mastering the fourth industrial revolution technologies has been noted (Kondratyev et al., 2022; Souza Júnior et al., 2022; Bilbao Ubillos et al., 2024).

A significant number of works by Russian authors are devoted to the Russian industrial policy. They substantiate measures to accelerate economic growth based on the construction of production complexes of a new technological mode (Bodrunov, 2015; Glazyev, 2019). An institutional approach to industrial policy is proposed, based on forming trustful interaction between the state, regional authorities and business communities with the participation of advisory development agencies (Polterovich, 2014). The studies by Tatarkin and Romanova (2007, 2008) emphasize the importance of a systemic multi-subject approach to industrial policy in Russia based on public-private partnership. Romanova and Ponomareva focus on a broad understanding of the role of industrial policy in transforming the economy structure and forming a favorable business environment (Romanova and Ponomareva, 2020. P. 28). Simachev et al. (2022) draw attention to the need to transform industrial policy in order to increase the economy sustainability, improve its structure and comply with the global trends in industrial development. It is shown that in the Russian realities, the industrial policy priorities should rely on the industrial technological development and financing of investment activity (Aganbegyan, 2012, 2024).

In this respect, industrial policy in the Union State of Russia and Belarus becomes more focused on scientific-technological development and is considered as a key tool to ensure economic security (Zemskov, 2023; Pak & Andronova, 2024). It is shown that a coordinated industrial policy can become a factor in overcoming systemic limitations of technical-technological development in the Union State (Bainev & Runkov, 2018). Macroeconomic integration processes in the Union State are studied (Bobkov, 2022; Bakhlov & Bakhlova, 2022). The importance of industrial cooperation is emphasized (Kokhno, 2019), but the incomplete implementation of the planned Union Programs is also stated (Prikhodko, 2024. P. 91). There is also a criticism of integration processes in the Union State, which are largely hindered at the stage of harmonization of the two countries’ economic interests (Suzdaltsev, 2021). An article by Lepesh proposes the use of the following mechanisms for a coordinated industrial policy of Russia and Belarus: specialized cross-border clusters, public-private partnership, joint industrial production, national projects, federal and regional development institutions (Lepesh, 2022. P. 9). The industrial policy objects are: scientific and technical reserve, integrated development of territories, industrial potential of enterprises and industries. It is proposed to create a special body of the Union State to build industrial production into global technological chains based on the latest technologies (Pobyvaev, 2017). It is shown that the main instrument of industrial policy of the Union State is planning and implementing the joint scientific-technical programs (Shurubovich, 2016. P. 15). At the same time, the authors note the insufficient number of works devoted to analyzing the industrial policy tools in the Union State of Russia and Belarus.

Evolution of the industrial policy of the Union State of Russia and Belarus

The evolution of the Common Industrial Policy of the Union State dates back to the declaration of the need for cooperation in the late 1990s and has come a long way to practical implementation in the form of signing important agreements in 2023–2024 (Table 2). The most important steps were the adoption of agreements on the recognition of technological operations, intensification of cooperation and creation of joint productions, as well as the development of a joint “Strategy of Scientific and Technological Development of the Union State for the period up to 2035” ³ . This contributes to strengthening the industrial base of the Union State and enhancing competitiveness in the inner and foreign markets.

The analysis of strategic documents shows that their interpretations of the “industrial policy” concept are quite similar, which indicates the consistency of approaches between the Union State countries (Table 3). At the same time, one can note that rather contradictory wordings about “competitiveness of the states’ products” in the internal market disappeared from the definition of “industrial policy” in the 2023 Agreement, while new sub-objectives appeared: “acceleration and increase of sustainability in the development of industrial complexes” and “development of innovative industries”.

Common to all the studied documents is the orientation of industrial policy towards the development of industrial potential and ensuring the competitiveness of industrial products, while the tasks of industrial policy are to increase efficiency and create conditions for innovative development. This said, in 1999 one of the tasks was to form a modern structure of industrial complexes, while in 2023 the priority shifted to accelerating and increasing the sustainability of development. In addition, the Union State emphasizes the importance of interstate cooperation, which is reflected in joint agreements.

The analysis of strategic documents of the Union State of Russia and Belarus shows that the main industrial policy tools are the development of industrial and technological cooperation, implementation of large industrial integration projects, development and implementation of targeted Union programs financed from the joint budget. If we compare the tools of the Union State’s common industrial policy implementation in 1998 and 2023, reflected in the Agreements on the common industrial policy between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus (Table 4), it becomes obvious that the 2023 Agreement introduces more modern support mechanisms, emphasizing the financing of projects with integration effect based on the world best practices, import substitution and elimination of barriers. This reflects the current economic realities and the need to adapt to new geopolitical conditions. At the same time, the main principles and tasks stipulated in the 1999 Agreement remain unchanged, which emphasizes the long-term significance of the Union State’s industrial policy.

Despite the 25 years between the documents, the basic principles and objectives of the Union State’s industrial policy remained unchanged. At the same time, the 2023 Agreement emphasizes the expansion of project support mechanisms and the creation of conditions for industrial cooperation, as well as special attention is paid to ensuring mutual participation of financial and non-financial institutions and banks of the Union State members in the projects implementation. In addition, compared to the 1999 Agreement, the 2023 Agreement provides for synchronization of scientific-technical programs with import substitution plans and their implementation to stimulate the development of new types of products, as well as for the elimination of barriers to the movement of industrial goods. The inclusion of import substitution plans and their implementation in the 2023 Agreement indicates adaptation to sanctions pressure and the need to achieve technological sovereignty in key sectors. At that, the emphasis on synchronizing scientific-technical programs with import substitution reflects the importance of innovations and technological progress.

It should be noted that both Agreements emphasize the development of industrial and technological cooperation and are aimed at stimulating the growth of industrial production and improving the products competitiveness. On the one hand, this means that the main objectives and tools of industrial policy remain important for deepening the economic integration of Russia and Belarus within the Union State. Such tasks as industrial cooperation and the creation of cross-national structures remain relevant for the industrial policy of the Union State, regardless of the level of their past implementation. Their retention in the new Agreement emphasizes their strategic importance.

On the other hand, the objectives and tasks outlined in the 1999 Agreement were not fully implemented for a number of reasons: a) economic crises, changes in the geopolitical situation and external sanctions, which affected the implementation of a common industrial policy; b) complex bureaucratic procedures and lack of coordination between different levels of government and public institutions; c) lack of funding both from state budgets and private businesses; d) dependence on foreign technological solutions, lack of certain knowledge-intensive technologies, insufficient investments in R&D; e) insufficient level of co-operation between Russian and Belarusian enterprises, problems with implementation of planned integration projects due to lack of co-ordination and unwillingness to cede control, etc.

The action plans for the implementation of the Union State Treaty for 2024–2026¹⁸ cover the following key areas: macroeconomic policy, financial market, tax policy and customs, industrial policy and trade, industrial and technological policy¹⁹ . The document emphasizes the importance and need for joint action. The proposed tools for the Union State’s industrial policy are summarized in Table 5.

The analysis of the program documents on industrial policy allows highlighting the following positive aspects:

1. a) priority areas of work are identified and specific tools for their implementation are given, such as the creation of joint ventures, harmonization of legislation, financing of innovation projects and infrastructure development, etc., and an attempt is made to describe the mechanisms of coordination and monitoring of their implementation;
2. b) some directions have implementation deadlines, but there are no stages of implementation of these tasks by years, which could have provided step-by-step control and the possibility of adjusting the action plans for the Main Directions implementation;
3. c) responsible bodies for the implementation of each direction on the Russian and Belarusian sides are identified.

However, the same problem remains as with the Union Programs, leaving the Agreement more of a “protocol of intentions”:

common wording: as in the Union Programs of 2021 to 2023, there prevails the rhetoric of “convergence of positions”, “harmonization”, “coordination”, “information transfer”, which emphasizes, on the one hand, the desire for unification; on the other hand, these wordings swarm from one document to another, while harmonization and unification have not been achieved over the course of 25 years;

1. b) the action plan lacks specificity (for example, most areas lack implementation deadlines), which makes their implementation and control difficult;
2. c) there are no specified mechanisms of the action plan coordination implementation between different bodies and management levels, which may slow down the deepening of Russian-Belarusian integration;
3. d) there is no risk assessment (financial, political, economic): external factors may affect the implementation of action plans for the Provisions Implementation Basic Guidelines.

Despite the shortcomings, the document sets a stable basis for practical implementation and coordination of joint efforts on economic and industrial cooperation between the two Union states.

Comparison of the development directions of the Union State Common Industrial Policy for 2021–2023 and 2024–2026

We compared the Common Industrial Policy tools by analyzing and comparing the Main Directions for the implementation of provisions of the Treaty on the Union State Establishment for 2021–2023²⁰ and 2024–2026²¹ . The comparison shows a certain evolution and expansion of the Union State industrial policy focus. The analysis of the provisions aimed at the creation and implementation of integration policy between Russia and Belarus in the industrial sphere has shown that, on the one hand, both documents emphasize the implementation of the Common Industrial Policy:

a) the importance of pursuing a Common Industrial Policy of the Union State is emphasized, which includes, first of all, coordination of actions on normative legal regulation;

b) development of cooperation in the industrial sectors of both states, including for the implementation of import-substitution projects;

c) the “cross-cutting nature” of these documents is noticeable: the Union Program on the formation of a common industrial policy for 2021–2023 indicated the need for “mutual recognition of technological operations carried out in the Union State territory” ²² , while the Action Plan for the implementation of the Union Policy for 2021–2023 mentions the need for “mutual recognition of technological operations carried out in the Union State territory”. The Plan of Implementation Measures for 2024–2026 focuses on “practical implementation of agreements on the recognition of technological operations carried out in the Union State territory”²³ .

On the other hand, the following differences were identified:

– first, the 2021–2023 document did not mention specific industry support roadmaps, whereas the 2024–2026 document states specific areas such as microelectronics, machine tool construction, agricultural and automotive engineering, specialized machine building and elevator construction;

– second, the 2024–2026 document pays more attention to technological development and import substitution, including plans to develop various areas of mechanical engineering and related infrastructure;

– third, the 2024–2026 document presents more detailed and specific measures, including the development of specific industries and the preparation of normative legal acts regulating joint activities in these areas; the 2021–2023 main directions were more generalized, focused on creating basic conditions and mechanisms for integration;

– fourth, while the 2021–2023 Union Program specified the implementation terms (by the beginning of 2023), the 2024–2026 Plan of Measures has only two paragraphs specifying the terms (31.12.2025) and control points (reporting semi-annually) of the seven points dedicated to the Union State Common Industrial Policy implementation.

Thus, the comparison of the directions of the Common Industrial Policy presented in the Main Directions for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Treaty on the Union State Establishment for 2021–2023 and for 2024–2026 shows that in 2024–2026, the Union State concretized the measures to implement the Common Industrial Policy. The introduction of roadmaps, focus on import substitution projects and more detailed directions indicate a desire to improve the effect of joint actions for deeper technological development and integration of the industrial sectors of Russia and Belarus. However, the lack of implementation deadlines for some areas may be critical and requires further elaboration.

Scientific-technical development and regional integration in the Union State

Russia and Belarus are one of the main trade and investment partners for each other. Russia has been ranking first among the countries investing in Belarus for many years, outstripping other, mainly European, countries by a wide margin²⁴ . According to the results of 2023, Russian investments in the Belarusian economy account for more than 60% of the total investment flow, while more than 90 % of Belarusian investments are also directed to Russia. This indicates very close economic ties and the interest of investment agents in interacting with each other, which is confirmed by the growing dynamics of Belarusian-Russian commodity trade turnover (Fig. 1). The increase in commodity trade turnover over the last three years amounted to more than 60%.

Most of the commodity trade turnover is made up of manufacturing products. The main goods exported from Russia to Belarus in 2022²⁵ were oil, oil products and minerals (32 %), as well as products of the manufacturing industry: metals and metal products (12 %), plastics and plastics products (7 %), machinery, equipment and apparatus (7 %), machinery and equipment (5 %), electrical equipment (4%), oilseeds and fruits (2 %). The main items of Belarusian exports to Russia are products of animal origin (16 %): milk, eggs, cheese, butter, meat, honey, as well as machinery, equipment and apparatus (9 %), transport (14 %), plastics, natural and synthetic rubber (6 %), food products (8 %), metals and metal products (6 %).

The priorities of financing scientific-technical development in the Union State countries differ in many respects (Fig. 2). The value of the GDP science intensity for 2017–2022 in Russia exceeds that in Belarus by almost two times, which indicates a higher funding for research and development. There is a downward trend in the GDP science intensity in the Union State, which is more noticeable for Belarus. The share of budget expenditures on financing R&D in Belarus ranges from 0,16 to 0,2 %, while in Russia it is almost twice as high and ranges from 0.41 to 0,51 %. At the same time, the share of investments in machinery and equipment is higher in Belarus, where it was 40,4 % in 2022, with just 30,8 % in Russia. There is a tendency for this share to decrease in the Republic of Belarus and to increase in the Russian Federation.

The analysis shows that in Russia R&D is financed more actively and purposefully by the state, while the Republic of Belarus prioritizes investments in production means and innovation activity by organizations. This is confirmed by the economic complexity index (Hidalgo 2021), calculated with international trade data (The Observatory of Economic Complexity²⁶ ). For Belarus, the economic complexity index amounted to 0.84 by 2022 data, ranking 32^nd in the world, between Canada and Spain. At the same time, the assessment for the previous five years shows that the Belarusian economy was increasing its economic complexity from 0.78 in 2018 to 0.82 in 2022, which is almost twice as high compared to the Russian Federation. In Russia, the economic complexity index corresponds to the 47^th place out of 139 countries, between Kuwait and Lebanon, and its value tends to decrease over the previous five-year period (from 0.49 in 2018 to 0.43 in 2022). However, the economic complexity index based on technology patenting statistics puts Russia in a more favorable position: 17^th place in the world ranking for Russia and 63^rd for Belarus.

Since industrial policy is designed to influence the activities of certain groups of enterprises, we assume that the economic integration of the Union State countries will change the dynamics of joint ventures’ presence in their regions. The analysis of the number of Belarusian companies with Russian participation in the authorized capital shows multidirectional dynamics (Fig. 3). In 2022 the number of organizations with Russian investments amounted to 2240, including 1056 joint Russian-Belarusian enterprises and 1175 companies with Russian ownership registered in the Republic of Belarus. On the one hand, until 2014 there was an increase in the number of joint ventures and companies with Russian capital in Belarus, followed by a long-term decline. The number of Russian-Belarusian joint ventures continues to decline throughout the entire period under study: from 1704 in 2014 to 1056 in 2022. A local minimum was observed in 2017, during a sharp increase in trade when the new customs code was adopted in EAEU and ratified in Belarus. At the same time, there is an upward trend in the number of Russian foreign companies in Belarus, growing by 168 % over 10 years and in 2022 exceeding the number of joint ventures.

On the one hand, the decrease in the number of organizations with Russian investments in Belarus may have a negative connotation, as it indicates the reduction of economic ties and actual interaction between enterprises in the Union State countries. On the other hand, the number of independent Russian enterprises in Belarus is growing, which may be a consequence of choosing a more suitable form of economic management for Russian investors in the Belarusian market.

Further, we collected and analyzed statistics on the number of Russian-Belarusian joint ventures in Russian regions, which follows the above trends: there is a decrease in the number of Russian-Belarusian joint ventures in Russia. Figure 4 presents data on the Russian-Belarusian joint ventures in Russian regions, where their number is the highest. The main regions of presence, as can be seen, are the border regions: Smolensk, Bryansk, Kaliningrad, as well as the industrially developed Kaluga, Tver, Belgorod regions and the Republic of Tatarstan.

The authors collected data on the number of joint ventures with Belarusian capital in 34 Russian regions²⁷ . A vast majority of Russian regions show similar trends of the reduction of joint ventures over the studied period. The peak in the number of registrations of joint ventures occurs in 2017–2018 and is followed by a decline. This trend is likely to be a consequence of the ongoing changes in the economic conditions of the Union State due to the border military conflict, external sanctions pressure, as well as economic and industrial policies.

The number of joint ventures in Russia peaked in 2017–2018, followed by a sharp decline. At the same time, there was a local minimum in the number of Russian enterprises in Belarus, followed by an increase in the number of foreign enterprises with Russian capital in the Belarusian jurisdiction. This indicates that it became less beneficial for enterprises to register joint projects due to the changed external conditions. What kind of changes might these have been? The authors incline to believe that it was influenced by the adoption in late 2016 and subsequent ratification by Belarus of the new EAEU Customs Code²⁸ , which came into force in 2018. The introduction of the EAEU Customs Code was aimed to significantly simplify customs clearance of goods between member countries, eliminate internal barriers to trade and ensure the formation of common markets, which largely determined the further direction of Eurasian integration. Perhaps, the elimination of various administrative barriers and the unification of economic space simplified foreign economic interaction between enterprises and eliminated the need to create joint legal entities to overcome them. In this respect, the Union State of Russia and Belarus, according to a number of experts, represents the core of Eurasian integration and its main driving force. However, the decline in the number of Russian-Belarusian joint ventures can also be seen as a consequence of deterioration of economic interaction.

Thus, the implementation of industrial policy in the Union State countries has ambitious goals. The tasks of industrial and technological development of Russia and Belarus are in many respects similar, as they are determined by the existing problems of reducing the technological gap formed during the years of catching-up development, unfavorable foreign policy environment, significant dependence on the high-tech products exports from developed countries. In this regard, elaboration of effective tools and analyzing the industrial policy effectiveness is an urgent scientific and practical task.

Conclusion

In the current conditions of aggravation of geopolitical situation, great pressure of sanctions, and sharp growth of technological competition in the world markets, it is critically strategically important to build mutually beneficial economic and industrial cooperation in the Union State. Interaction in the sphere of scientific and technological development should be carried out with a view of achieving competitiveness in key areas of the most advanced technologies’ development. Uniting the two states’ efforts in the field of industrial cooperation will make it possible to ensure mutually beneficial partnership, increase trade turnover, ensure access of products to each other’s domestic markets, and jointly enter foreign markets.

In recent years in the Union State the processes of economic integration at the political level have received a fairly wide coverage; significant efforts are made to deepen them, including through the implementation of a common industrial policy. The Agreement on a common industrial policy, which is an integral part of the Main Guidelines for the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on the Union State Establishment for 2024–2026, is designed to contribute to the goals of building a common industrial, scientific, technological, financial space, uniting material, intellectual and human capital to obtain a new quality of industrial development in the Union State.

The great advantage of forming common approaches to industrial policy consists in the fact that the enterprises of the two states become partners rather than competitors. Assumingly, enterprises of similar industries will interact, sharing experience and creating innovative products. At the same time, the statistics of joint ventures with Belarusian capital in Russia and with Russian capital in Belarus indicates a change in economic conditions in the Union State. Since 2017, the number of joint ventures has been decreasing; this may be a consequence of both a reduction of international barriers in trade and economy and the enterprises’ declined interest in bilateral interactions. It is possible that the formation of a common economic space makes it unprofitable to establish joint ventures, facilitating economic cooperation through simple contractual relations. This assumption is partly confirmed by the growing number of foreign enterprises with Russian capital on the Belarusian market.

It should be noted that the industrial policy of the Union State is currently aimed at overcoming dependence on supplies of foreign equipment and components, creating a common economic space, ensuring common economic conditions for favorable industrial development and achieving leadership in such areas as space, military-industrial complex, energy, microelectronics, automotive industry, unmanned transport systems, medicine and pharmaceuticals. The main tools of industrial policy to achieve these goals are the planning, financing and implementation of joint scientific-technological programs and projects. As a result, this interaction is supposed to not only help withstand geopolitical confrontation and ensure technological sovereignty, but also form the basis for advanced development and occupying leading positions in foreign markets.

The author’s contributions

Е. V. Potaptseva developed the research idea and methodology, searched for and structured information regarding the research topic; prepared the research section on the evolution of program documents of the Russia and Belarus Union State’s industrial policy.

О. S. Bryantseva implemented the research program, collected and processed information, prepared the analysis of foreign and domestic literary sources concerning the research topic; prepared the section on the analysis of scientific and technological development and regional integration in the Union State.

Е. V. Presniakova implemented the research program, prepared the section on the evolution of program documents of the Union State industrial policy.

Вклад авторов

Е. В. Потапцева – разработка идеи и методологии исследования, поиск и структурирование информации относительно тематики исследования. Подготовка раздела исследования по теме эволюции программных документов промышленной политики Союзного государства России и Белоруссии.

О. С. Брянцева – реализация программы исследования, сбор и обработка информации, подготовка анализа зарубежных и отечественных литературных источников, касающихся тематики исследования. Подготовка раздела по анализу научно-технического развития и региональной интеграции в Союзном государстве.

Е. В. Преснякова – реализация программы исследования, подготовка раздела по теме эволюции программных документов промышленной политики Союзного государства.

Conflict of Interest / Конфликт интересов

No conflict of interest is declared by the authors / Авторами не заявлен