ELECTORAL CORRUPTION AND MODEL OF ELECTION PARTICIPATION IN RUSSIA
Abstract
Objective: to show that electoral corruption can affect all stages of elective process. To prove that electoral corruption is used both for barring political competition and for pressing the voters directly to distort their declaration of will. Methods: comparative-legal, systemic analysis. Results: the definition of electoral corruption is proposed, as well as its institutional mechanism as abuse of administrative resource of public power. Classification of the types of administrative resource of public power is given. Scientific novelty: the Russian model of election participation is described. Basing on its analysis, it is revealed how various types of administrative resource abuse can influence the election results. Practical value: the provisions are researched which characterize the main types of “administrative resource”: power, regulatory, legislative, institutional, financial, information-communicational and status. Interconnection is shown between using the administrative resource and the election results.
Conflicts of Interest Disclosure:
The authors declares that there is no conflict of interest.
Article info:
Date submitted: 11.10.2021
Published: 30.12.2013
The author has read and approved the final manuscript.
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About the Author
Y. A. Nisnevich
National Research University “Higher School of Economics” and Russian University of People’s Friendship
Russian Federation
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For citations:
Nisnevich Y.A.
ELECTORAL CORRUPTION AND MODEL OF ELECTION PARTICIPATION IN RUSSIA. Actual Problems of Economics and Law. 2013;(4):52-60.
(In Russ.)
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