РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ КАК ДЕЛЕГИРОВАНИЕ

Цель: рассмотрение идеи обратного делегирования, когда государство является принципалом, а частные лица -агентами с точки зрения бихевиористской теории «принципал - агент». Методы: статистический, социологического опроса.Результаты: государство принимает за нас решения либо помогает нам прийти к решению, которое считает наиболее правильным, в самых разных областях, начиная от пенсионных накоплений, топливного сектора и продажи лекарств и заканчивая потребительским кредитованием и потреблением продуктов питания, т. е. выполняет функции нашего агента. С точки зрения теории «принципал - агент» и бихевиористской теории «принципал - агент» большу́ю долю регулирования в современном мире можно расценивать как гипотетическое делегирование. В статье, переходя от благосостояния отдельного человека к проблеме общественного благосостояния, рассматривается идея обратного делегирования, когда государство служит принципалом, а частные лица - агентами. Показано, что природа делегирования меняется в зависимости от контекста. В статье описаны условия, при которых тот или иной подход будет иметь смысл. Научная новизна: работа посвящена зарубежному опыту регулирования через делегирование полномочий на примере страны с развитой рыночной экономикой (США), показаны перспективы данного подхода в решении как публичных, так и частных задач. Рассматривается применение теории «принципал - агент» и бихевиористской теории «принципал - агент» для разграничения таких видов гипотетического делегирования, как информирование, стандартные правила, поощрения, возвраты, мандаты и запреты. Разобраны преимущества и затраты на делегирование, определены обстоятельства, при которых тот или иной подход имеет смысл.Практическая значимость: теория «принципал - агент» широко применяется в экономике и политологии и может служить удобным инструментом для рассмотрения оптимального масштаба и сущности той помощи, которую предоставляет нам государство в качестве нашего агента. Работа представляет интерес для отечественной юридической науки, поскольку в России институт делегирования является малоизученным правовым явлением.

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