REGULATION OF THE TRANSFER MARKET IN PROFESSIONAL RUSSIAN FOOTBALL: IMPACT OF THE LIMIT FOR LEGIONARIES IN 2005-2016

Objective: to estimate the efficiency of limit for legionaries as a tool for regulating the Russian transfer market. Methods: formal methods of the labor market supply and demand model, combinatory analysis, statistical methods. Results: the article views the order of regulation of the labor relations with foreign legionaries in sports. It is defined that in most countries regulation implies limitation of the number of legionaries who can be claimed for the season or be on the field. The article analyzes the approaches to the transfer market regulation methods, as well as the arguments for and against limiting the number of legionaries. Basing on the analysis of literature, the author estimates the efficiency of transfer market regulating from the economics viewpoint, as well as the results of sports events.The author checks the hypothesis about the inefficiency of the limit as a tool for increasing the quality of the Russian players’ performance, based on a number of indicators, such as the inefficiency of the national team’s performance, number of legionaries, their performance, etc. The estimation was carried out on the basis of a number of theoretical models: 1) model of increasing the footballers’ salaries; 2) model of free selection of players by the coach and 3) model of quality players’ selection. Basing on these models, the hypothesis was disproved of the rapid “victory effect” from the limit - the first significant results of the regulation appeared in Russia not earlier than after 10 years. It is supposed that the limit can be explained by G. Akerlof’s model: by controlling the number of legionaries, it is possible to attract more qualified foreign players into the national league. Analysis of the Russian teams’ experience showed that the limit has not resulted in: 1) the increase of the legionaries’ quality of performance; 2) the increase of the playing time of the Russian players on the field in the national championship; 3) the increase of competitiveness of the Russian national team in international tournaments; 4) the increase of investments into youth football, but has caused the increase of both Russian and foreign footballers’ salaries.Scientific novelty: applying the economic approach to the transfer market analysis allowed to obtain scientific conclusions about the influence of the limit and to substantiate the main argumentative reasons used in the public discussion.Practical significance: the main conclusions of the article can be used in making decisions about correcting the limit for legionaries on the eve of hosting the World Cup in Russia.

экономика и управление народным хозяйством, экономика футбола, лимит на легионеров, рынок труда, футбольные лиги, клубы, трансферный рынок

1. Hatton T. J. The economics of international migration: A short history of the debate // Labour Economics. 2014. T. 30. C. 43-50.

2. Schmutte I. M. Free to move? A network analytic approach for learning the limits to job mobility // Labour Economics. 2014. T. 29. C. 49-61.

3. Fortin N., Lemieux T., Torres J. Foreign human capital and the earnings gap between immigrants and Canadian-born workers // Labour Economics. 2016. T. 41. C. 104-119.

4. Strobl E., Walsh F. Monopsony, minimum wages and migration // Labour Economics. 2016. T. 42. C. 221-237.

5. Прокопец М. А. Лимит на легионеров в Российской Федерации. Проблемы и перспективы // Спорт: экономика, право, управление. 2009. № 3. C. 17-22.

6. Vrooman J. Theory of the beautiful game: The unification of European football // Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 2007. T. 54, № 3. C. 314-354.

7. Воробьев А. И., Солнцев И. В., Осокин Н. А. Анализ международного опыта развития футбола и его применение в России с учетом подготовки к Чемпионату мира по футболу ФИФА 2018. М: НИЦ ИНФРА-М, 2016. 172 с.

8. Hardman A., Iorwerth H. Player quotas in elite club football // Sport, Ethics and Philosophy. 2014. Vol. 8, No. 2. Pp. 147-156.

9. Lang M., Rathke A., Runkel M. The Economic Consequences of Foreigner Rules in National Sports Leagues // Région et Développement (forthcoming). 2010.

10. Haan M., Koning R. H., Van Witteloostuijn A. Market forces in European soccer. University of Groningen, 2002. 22 р.

11. Hoehn T., Szymanski S. The americanization of European football // Economic Policy. 1999. Vol. 14, No. 28. Pp. 204-240.

12. Kesenne S. The peculiar international economics of professional football in Europe // Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 2007. Vol. 54, No. 3. Pp. 388-399.

13. Feess E., Mühlheuβer G. Economic consequences of transfer fee regulations in European football // European Journal of Law and Economics. 2002. Vol. 13, No. 3. Pp. 221-237.

14. Alvarez J., Forrest D., Sanz I., Tena J. d. D. Impact of importing foreign talent on performance levels of local co-workers // Labour Economics. 2011. Vol. 18, No. 3. Pp. 287-296.

15. Sports Governance, Development and Corporate Responsibility // Routledge Research in Sport, Culture and Society / еd. Segaert B. et. al., 2012, рр. 74-88.

16. Akerlof G. A. The market for" lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism // The quarterly journal of economics. 1970. Pp. 488-500.

17. Charyev G. Consequences of the limit on foreign players in Russian football // Soccer & Society. 2016. Vol. 17, No. 4. Pp. 571-587.