The wholesale problem with Congress: the dangerous decline of expertise in the legislative process

Objective: to document the declining respect for expertise in the US Congress, the implications for policymaking given the wholesale nature of the legislative process, and some possible ways to account for the decline of expertise in the legislative process.

Methods: dialectical approach to cognition of social phenomena, allowing to analyze them in historical development and functioning in the context of the totality of objective and subjective factors, which predetermined the following research methods: formal-logical and sociological.

Results: It is no surprise to anyone that the US Congress has become a hyperpartisan battleground where little effort is expended to promote policies that work for Americans. While the US Congress has always viewed policy issues through the lens of party politics, the role of nonpartisan expertise in the legislative process is at an all-time low. The disrespect for experts is growing across society, but the decline in their use is particularly troubling in the US Congress because it exacerbates deficiencies that are inherent to the legislative process. The US Congress passes laws of general applicability and does not sit in judgment of specific applications of the law. Whether the US Congress does a good job setting those general policies depends on the process it uses for doing so. Sometimes, though increasingly rarely, the US Congress gathers the relevant facts and arguments about different aspects of a problem before acting. More often, legislators have specific outlier problems or prototypes in mind when they draft legislation, and if there is not an expert fact-finding process in place to study a proposal, cognitive biases may go unchecked.

Scientific novelty: Part I details the role nonpartisan experts have played in the legislative process over time and documents the various ways that experts have fallen out of favor in the US Congress. Part II explains why this decline of expert involvement in legislation is particularly troubling given the way the US Congress operates as a body making wholesale policy with little individualized feedback on how its policies are applying to real-world scenarios. Part III then turns to the question of what, if anything, could or should be done about it. While the US Congress could, in theory, shift course, that seems unlikely. Throughout its history, the US Congress has cared about nonpartisan expertise when it worried about presidential overreach. But with parties dominating the political landscape, there is little likelihood that the US Congress will care enough about its institutional position relative to the executive. In the absence of legislative reform, Part III therefore considers two additional implications of the decline of expertise in the legislative process. First, the decline of internal expertise in the legislative body places greater weight on the use of administrative agencies to provide that guidance. Ironically, the US Supreme Court may be toying with a revitalization of the nondelegation doctrine at the precise moment that delegation is most urgently needed. Second, courts and other bodies that interpret statutes could consider the relationship between statutory meaning and the US Congress’s consultation with nonpartisan experts to help address statutory ambiguities.

Practical significance: the main provisions and conclusions of the article can be used in scientific, pedagogical and law enforcement activities when considering the issues related to the functioning of the US Congress.

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