Dark network resilience in a hostile environment: optimizing centralization and density

Objective: to analyze the legal nature, structure, and features of violent extremism and to develop measures to prevent this illegal behavior.

Methods: dialectical approach to cognition of social phenomena, allowing to analyze them in historical development and functioning in the context of the totality of objective and subjective factors, which predetermined the following research methods: formal-logical and sociological.

Results: in recent years, the world has witnessed the emergence of violent extremists (VEs), and they have become an ongoing concern for countries around the globe. A great deal of effort has been expended examining their nature and structure in order to aid in the development of interventions to prevent further violence. Analysts and scholars have been 

particularly interested in identifying structural features that enhance (or diminish) VE resilience to exogenous and endogenous shocks. As many have noted, VEs typically seek to balance operational security and capacity/efficiency. Some argue that their desire for secrecy outweighs their desire for efficiency, which leads them to be less centralized with few internal connections. Others argue that centralization is necessary because security is more easily compromised and that internal density promotes solidarity and limits countervailing influences. Unsurprisingly, scholars have found evidence for both positions. In this paper, we analyze the Noordin Top terrorist network over time to examine the security-efficiency tradeoff from a new perspective. We find that the process by which they adopt various network structures is far more complex than much of the current literature suggests.

Scientific novelty: the research showed that a dark network’s adoption of a network structure is far more complex than what current literature suggests, namely that a network structure at either side of the cohesion and centralization continuums offers potential advantages and disadvantages in terms of network resilience. In the case of Noordin Top, it appears that his network’s focus on establishing external ties after its operations provided it possible access to resources but likely became a factor contributing to its exposure and eventual disruption. The network, much like its Bali I predecessors who also focused on establishing external ties after their operation, faced significant losses and needed to reconstitute itself immediately following each operation. This tendency, along with the general adoption of a centralized structure, suggests that Noordin’s network adopted a suboptimal structure that ultimately contributed to his demise.

Practical significance: the main provisions and conclusions of the article can be used in scientific, pedagogical and law enforcement activities when considering the issues related to fighting extremism and terrorism.

The article was first published in English language by Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society and The Western Society of

Criminology Hosting by Scholastica. For more information please contact: CCJLS@WesternCriminology.org The submitted material is published in full, as interpreted by the author.

For original publication: Everton, S. F., & Cunningham, D. (2015). Dark network resilience in a hostile environment: optimizing centralization and density. Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society, 16(1), 1–20.

Publication URL: https://ccjls.scholasticahq.com/article/341-dark-network-resilience-in-a-hostile-environment-optimizingcentralization-and-density

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